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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that ill persons can experience epistemic injustice in the sense 
articulated by Miranda Fricker (2007). Ill persons can suffer testimonial injustice through the 
presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability 
that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons can also suffer hermeneutical 
injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and 
communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical resources. We then 
argue that epistemic injustice arises in part owing to the epistemic privilege enjoyed by the 
practitioners and institutions of contemporary healthcare services – the former owing to their 
training, expertise, and third-person psychology, and the latter owing to their implicit 
privileging of certain styles of articulating and evidencing testimonies in ways that 
marginalise ill persons. We suggest that a phenomenological toolkit may be part of an effort 
to ameliorate epistemic injustice. 
 
Keywords  epistemic injustice, illness, patient experience, phenomenology, patient 
toolkit 
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Running head Do ill people suffer epistemic injustice? 
Introduction 
―That really, really hurts‖, says the woman who has just given birth to the doctor. He is 
sitting by her splayed feet, which rest on stirrups either side of him. He is stitching her 
vagina, his face inches away from her body. A crowd of doctors and nurses surround the 
baby lying a few feet away. He is being bundled, rubbed, and his airways cleared by eight 
health professionals. But none of them hear, or respond to, the woman‘s complaint. She 
repeats: ―That hurts. Are you using anaesthetic?‖. ―No‖, the doctor replies calmly, ―there is 
no need to. I‘m nearly finished‖. The woman is too exhausted to persist and she says nothing 
more. It is hard to imagine another situation in which we would not offer pain relief to 
someone having a needle pushed through their genitals. But in this case the woman‘s 
testimony is not taken seriously enough to be acted upon. Her pain is either not fully 
registered or not considered worthy of response. The woman‘s claim about how much pain 
she feels is dismissed.
1
 
Similar situations arise in the context of healthcare provision. Many of us are familiar with 
stories about doctors who don‘t listen, large-scale healthcare systems that are impersonal and 
bureaucratic, and feelings of helplessness when trying to navigate these systems. Focusing on 
the epistemic dimension of these situations, we suggest that patients‘ testimonies are often 
dismissed as irrelevant, confused, too emotional, unhelpful, or time-consuming. A common 
complaint from physicians is that patients‘ speech is full of irrelevant information, that 
patients are (understandably) upset and therefore can be irrational, and that listening for 
                                                                
1
 This scene was observed by one of the authors (HC), whilst shadowing a paediatrician 
consultant at Gloucestershire Royal Hospital, UK, on ???. 
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medically relevant information precludes listening to other information conveyed in patient 
speech (such as existential concerns, need for empathy, or emotional content). In addition, 
since patients are not properly trained in the relevant medical terminology and the particular 
discourse of health professionals, anything they did say may be judged to be insufficiently 
articulate.
2
 So even if the patient‘s testimony were relevant, emotionally balanced and so on, 
what they say is not expressed in the accepted language of medical discourse and will 
therefore be assigned a deflated epistemic status. As one physician said: ―patients say a lot of 
irrelevant things like ‗when I eat lettuce my elbow hurts‘. I have to listen carefully for the 
important stuff and ignore the rest‖ (personal communication).3 
We propose submitting this problem to an epistemic analysis, using Miranda Fricker‘s (2007) 
notion of epistemic injustice. We argue that ill people suffer testimonial injustice, because 
they are often regarded as cognitively unreliable, emotionally compromised, or existentially 
unstable in ways that renders their testimonies and interpretations suspect. We present some 
examples involving both somatic and mental illness. Ill people also suffer hermeneutical 
injustice, because the kind of experiences illness affords are often difficult to make sense of 
and communicate (Carel 2013). Perhaps certain extreme and unique experiences cannot be 
communicated in any direct, propositional manner, and so are only shareable with persons 
                                                                
2
 These discourses may vary greatly; we are not suggesting that there is only one such 
discourse. 
3
 Perhaps it is also a sort of epistemic injustice to complain that a person’s style of testimony 
is no good (inarticulate, etc.) but do nothing to ameliorate this (e.g. by critically reflecting 
upon the reasons that one has for using these unhelpful formats rather than others). Epistemic 
injustice might arise because (a) one buys into epistemically unjust structures or because (b) 
one fails to challenge those structures. 
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whom one recognises to have had similar experiences—those with whom one shares a 
standpoint or a sense of solidarity, say.
4
 
We further argue that health professionals are considered to be epistemically privileged (in 
both warranted and unwarranted ways) by virtue of their training, expertise and third-person 
psychology; moreover, they decide which patient testimonies and interpretations to act upon. 
We contrast cases in which patients have undeservedly low credibility with cases in which 
patients have undeservedly high credibility. We show that these are two ways in which health 
professionals‘ clinical judgement is skewed because they assign too little or too much 
epistemic credibility to patients. In certain extreme cases of paternalistic medicine patients 
might simply not be regarded as epistemic contributors to their case in anything except the 
thinnest manner (e.g. confirming their name or ‗where it hurts‘). Denying someone credibility 
they deserve is one form of epistemic injustice; denying them the role of a contributing 
epistemic agent at all is a distinct form of epistemic exclusion (Hookway 2010). 
Finally, we suggest that the structures of contemporary healthcare practice encourage 
epistemic injustice because they privilege certain styles of articulating testimonies, certain 
forms of evidence, and certain ways of presenting and sharing knowledge, e.g. privileging 
impersonal third-person reports, in ways that structurally disable certain testimonial and 
hermeneutical activities. To address this problem we propose that phenomenology, and in 
particular a phenomenological toolkit (Carel 2012), may provide a useful hermeneutic 
context within which patients can reflect on and share their illness experience. The toolkit 
(and similar reflective practices) may improve communication at no cost to health 
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For an engaging discussion of the relationship between epistemic injustice, standpoint, and 
solidarity, see Medina (2012). 
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professionals because patients benefiting from the toolkit would be enabled (a) better to 
articulate their experiences and (b) to thereby be more effective contributors to their care. The 
phenomenological toolkit can address hermeneutical injustice by providing patients with a 
framework through which to understand their experiences. It can address testimonial injustice 
by both helping patients articulate their illness experience and aiding health professionals in 
understanding it.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: section one presents Fricker‘s notion of epistemic 
injustice and discusses illness as a case of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Section 
two provides examples from healthcare to support our claims. Section three outlines the 
epistemic privilege of health professionals and how healthcare practices are structurally 
disabling. Section four proposes the phenomenological toolkit as one type of remedy for the 
problem of epistemic injustice suffered by ill people.  
 
1. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice 
Miranda Fricker argues that ―there is a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice‖ which is a 
wrong done to someone in their capacity as knower (2007, 1). She identifies two such 
wrongs, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when 
prejudice causes a hearer to assign a deflated level of credibility to a speaker‘s testimony. 
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in collective interpretative resources puts a 
speaker at a disadvantage when trying to make sense of their social experiences (ibid.). We 
suggest that these two kinds of injustice characterise many attitudes ill people encounter 
when they try to voice their opinions about their care, convey their experiences, or state their 
priorities and preferences. In particular we suggest that an ill person may be regarded as 
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cognitively unreliable, emotionally compromised, existentially unstable or otherwise 
epistemically unreliable in a way that renders their testimonies and interpretations suspect 
simply by virtue of their status as an ill person with little sensitivity to their factual condition 
and state of mind.  
Epistemic injustice can manifest in different ways and to different degrees. Although all 
instances of epistemic injustice will share a common conceptual core, that of denigrating or 
downgrading certain persons‘ testimonies and interpretations, the precise forms of such 
injustice can vary greatly, ranging from the blunt and brutal to the subtle and difficult to spot. 
In the case of illness, the forms that epistemic injustice can take will be shaped by a range of 
factors, including particular healthcare policies, diagnostic practices, and even the format of 
patient feedback forms. Such issues clearly make the task of identifying and characterising 
the epistemic injustice that ill persons experience much more difficult, but they also offer a 
double advantage. First, they make it easier to identify the specific practices and policies that 
generate epistemic injustice in a given case. Second, they help to pinpoint our claim: it is not 
that modern healthcare practices are epistemically unjust but that certain policies, practices 
and cultural norms within modern healthcare practice are liable to generate epistemic 
injustice. We do not argue that, say, the doctor-patient relationship is necessarily and 
inevitably an epistemically unjust one, but rather that certain of the forms it can take are 
prone to generate epistemic injustice. We aim to offer a means of identifying practices and 
biases that lead to epistemic injustice in healthcare practice rather than to criticise this 
practice tout court. 
The charge of epistemic injustice can be analysed in terms of the two specific forms which 
Fricker identifies: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Although some writers, 
such as Hookway (2010), have identified other forms that epistemic injustice can take, we 
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take it that these are supplements to, rather than rejections of, the twin concepts of testimonial 
and hermeneutical injustice as Fricker defines them. 
An ill person can suffer testimonial injustice in one of several ascending ways. At the 
simplest level, ill people‘s testimonies can simply be ignored by healthcare professionals, 
perhaps being heard but neither acknowledged nor considered. Or those testimonies may be 
heard but excluded from epistemic consideration; so a genuinely sympathetic physician might 
listen to her patients‘ testimonies but fail to see that those testimonies may be worthy of 
epistemic consideration, of being useful or informative, say. Patient testimonies may be heard 
and acknowledged, but judged to be irrelevant or insufficiently articulate, and so once again 
excluded from epistemic consideration. A patient may lack the language and concepts to 
express their situation, perhaps resorting to clichés that physicians judge to be too coarse or 
idiomatic to be of use, or feeling that they ought to employ formal medical vocabularies in 
which they know themselves to be inexpert. Or those testimonies may be acknowledged but 
subordinated to the authority of health professionals, so what the patient has to say is heard, 
but coupled to the conviction that it is the expressed or implicit view of the health 
professionals (and in particular physicians) that is authoritative or primary. So the ill person 
may be judged to be a useful informant but not a participant in the collective practice of 
interpretation and understanding of their medical situation. These indicate some of the 
strategies, implicit or explicit, by which the testimonies of ill persons can be excluded or 
downgraded in a way that secures the charge of epistemic injustice. Importantly, we do not 
suggest that these strategies are systematically employed consciously or deliberately and 
certainly not with malice (although they may be). Indeed, Fricker gives the example of a 
woman who holds explicitly feminist views, but nonetheless discounts female political 
candidates due to unconscious epistemic bias (Fricker 2007, 38). Rather, we are pointing to a 
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set of practices and behaviours based on presuppositions and assumptions that are rarely 
reflected on and seem to be largely tacit.  
To demonstrate this point here are two examples of inappropriate credibility assigned to 
patient testimonies. The first example is that of Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/ Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome (ME/CFS) patients, whose disorder is not recognised by many physicians or 
considered a psychiatric (not somatic) illness. In the 2011 documentary Voices from the 
Shadows, directors Josh Biggs and Natalie Boulton interview ME/CFS patients, who report 
distinctively somatic symptoms such as pain, sensitivity to light and noise, and fatigue. 
However, because the medical and nosological status of ME/CFS is contested, these reports 
are disbelieved or subsumed under a different interpretation (e.g. that the patients suffer from 
abuse or that they have a psychiatric illness). Here are a few examples. One patient says: ―my 
suffering was belittled‖ (2:25). Another comments on the high degree of disbelief in the 
reality of ME/CFS as a bona fide disease (8:00). And a family reports that ―belief turns to 
disbelief when tests come back normal‖ and describes how ―professionals turn against the 
family‖ suspecting that the family is harming the child suffering from the condition (34:39). 
In extreme cases, children with ME/CFS are removed from their family, care proceedings are 
initiated, and children placed in closed psychiatric units or in foster care. These practices 
stem from a deep disbelief in the reality of ME/CFS as a somatic medical disease. Given this 
context, it is not surprising that patient and families‘ testimonies are accorded no credibility 
and their interpretation (that the child has ME/CFS) is rejected in favour of another 
interpretation (that the child suffers abuse or has a psychiatric disorder). 
Contrast this with documented cases of Munchausen Syndrome (factitious disease), in which 
people produce or feign disease (e.g. by taking laxatives or wounding themselves) for 
Do ill people suffer epistemic injustice? 
9 
 
complex psychological reasons.
5
 In these cases, patients take up physicians‘ time and are 
given considerable medical attention although the symptoms are feigned or made up (Savino 
& Fordtran 2006). Against the backdrop assumption that no one would seek medical help 
unless they were ill, patient reports of symptoms are normally believed. Only after repeated 
visits to the doctor, medical facts that contradict the patient‘s story, or the absence of 
supporting medical documentation, do health professionals revise the level of credibility 
assigned to such patients‘ testimonies. These two examples illustrate the power and discretion 
exercised by health professionals when listening to patient testimonies and the two ways in 
which credibility assignment can be faulty: too high or too low. However, this usually tacit 
epistemic assessment taking place in patient-health professional encounters does not receive 
attention in medical education and training and indicates the need for attention to this 
phenomenon. 
What would testimonial justice look like? In testimonial justice the testimonies of ill persons 
are recognised, sought out, included within epistemic consideration, judged to be relevant and 
articulate (where they are) and, at least in certain respects, judged as epistemically 
authoritative. The testimonially just health professional is ―alert to the possibility that her 
relative unintelligibility to him is a function of a collective hermeneutical impoverishment, 
and he adjusts or suspends his credibility judgement accordingly‖ (Fricker 2007, 7). So a 
testimonially just physician, confronted with ‗subjective‘, emotionally-charged, existentially-
intense patient testimonies whose medical value s/he cannot discern might think: ―The fact 
                                                                
5
 The Baron Münchausen (1720–1797) was a German war hero who travelled around 
Germany describing his military adventures. There is no evidence that he feigned disease or 
duped people into caring for him. As Feldman (2004) notes, Rudolph Erich Raspe 
appropriated the Baron’s name for the title of a 1785 pamphlet of outrageous and patently 
false tales, Baron Munchausen’s Narrative of His Marvelous Travels and Campaigns in 
Russia. 
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that I don‘t understand you isn‘t your fault, but mine; even your best efforts to make yourself 
understood are failing, not because of their inarticulacy, but because I am untrained in the 
appreciation of the sort of articulacy you are using, and this hermeneutical context does not 
provide me with those resources.‖ 
Similar considerations apply to cases of hermeneutical injustice; hence our treatment of this 
will be brief. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when someone‘s testimony is not squarely 
disbelieved but a conceptual impoverishment in a particular culture prevents that person from 
being able to clearly articulate their testimony. This generates what Fricker calls ―a gap in 
collective hermeneutical resources‖ (ibid.). Fricker gives as an example the case of sexual 
harassment in a culture in which the concept itself does not exist. How would one go about 
making the relevant assertions if one lacks the concepts to do so? Importantly, hermeneutical 
injustice needs to be cashed out in contextual terms e.g. showing what sorts of practices or 
social norms or institutional structures generate it. Articulating this injustice is the task of this 
section.  
In the case of illness, the interpretations that ill persons make of their own experiences may 
simply be ignored or not sought out, or implicitly excluded through the establishment of a 
culture in which patient testimonies are not respected or included within policy, thereby 
withdrawing incentives to encourage ill persons to offer their interpretations. Or patient 
interpretations may be heard and considered but judged to be irrelevant or insufficiently 
articulate, perhaps because they are too bound up with ‗subjective‘ concerns and anxieties or 
because the practice of taking them seriously is not recognised as being of potential 
therapeutic value. Or those interpretations may be reductively seen as another source of 
information that can be assessed or utilised by health professionals as if those hermeneutical 
offerings were simply data and so not treated as being an epistemically distinctive form of 
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knowledge. Later in the paper we appeal to phenomenology to indicate how a tendency to 
elide first-person accounts with third-person reports can have deleterious consequences. 
However, it is important to note that as well as being harmful, it is an epistemic error in itself 
to collapse important distinctions between first-person and third-person reports because it 
deprives us of sufficiently sophisticated and nuanced epistemic resources.  
An ill person experiences hermeneutical justice, by contrast, when the interpretations of ill 
persons are recognised, sought out, included within epistemic consideration, judged to be 
relevant and articulate (where they are) and, at least in certain aspects, judged as 
epistemically authoritative. An example of epistemic justice, incorporating both testimonial 
and hermeneutical justice, is the case of Kingston General Hospital (KGH) in Ontario, 
Canada. Following financial failure and high rates of patient complaints, KGH was 
completely redesigned using patient input at each step. The hospital has a Patient and Family 
Advisory Council and patient experience advisors are members of key hospital committees.
6
 
Every decision made at KGH must have a patient included in its consultation or provide a 
reason why patients were not consulted; patient-health professionals‘ co-design is 
fundamental to the hospital‘s practice.7 
 
2. Examples of epistemic injustice in illness 
The foregoing accounts are schematic and should not be interpreted as a rigidly categorical 
description of the ‗stages‘ of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice must not be conceived in 
                                                                
6
http://www.kgh.on.ca/en/aboutkgh/Patient%20and%20Family%20Advisory%20Council/Pag
es/default.aspx (accessed on 10 June 2013). 
7
 Leslie Thomson, KGH Chief Executive, talk at King’s Fund on 8th November 2012. 
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terms of abstract epistemological analysis alone, says Fricker, for it must be sensitive to a 
‗socially situated account‘ which recognises that human beings qua epistemic agents are 
recognised as ―operating as social types who stand in relations of power to one another‖ 
(Fricker, 2007, 3). Therefore the epistemic injustice that is experienced by ill persons must be 
sensitive to their social situation, comparative credibility, and so on, including factors such as 
intergenerational variation in doctors‘ attitudes towards their patients. We also need to 
identify different degrees of injustice, to help pin certain sorts of injustice to certain persons, 
to make easier the task of correlating forms of injustice to specific policies and practices. 
Perhaps certain more conservative and authoritarian doctors might simply ignore patient 
testimonies, whereas others do not. It also may be the case that health professionals would 
welcome patient testimonies, but the acceptable formats for collecting such information does 
not suit the kind of testimony patients wish to share (e.g. using yes/ no questions where 
nuance and context are essential; giving limited space to describe an event or experience; 
asking only about specific aspects of healthcare provision; asking patients to fill in such 
questionnaires in public spaces with little time and privacy to reflect on the experience). 
Here are some examples of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice
8
:  
‗I asked a professor whether being exposed to reduced oxygen levels long-term, the 
way I am, would have any detrimental effects on cognitive function e.g. would that 
explain why my memory had rapidly become much worse?  He just laughed off my 
genuine and serious concern by saying he had the same problem and sometimes 
couldn‘t even remember his wife‘s name. I never did get a proper reply to that 
question.‘ 
                                                                
8
 These examples are taken from responses to a query we posted on a patient mailing list in 
2012. 
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‗I don‘t mention problems because though they are real for me, they‘re minor in the 
grand scheme of things.‘9 
‗I had an abnormal cervical smear, so was sent to the large city teaching hospital for a 
coloscopy. I changed into the usual ties-up-the-back gown, with the usual vital ties 
missing, and then went through for the examination. It‘s a bit uncomfy but I was ok. 
Lots of big sighs from the consultant with his head between my legs. Then off he 
goes, leaving the room. I‘m told to follow. So I arrive, naked under a gown which 
doesn‘t do up, slightly damp between the legs and a bit stressed as I have to sit down 
and I‘m worried about leaving a wet patch. He goes on to tell me I need an operation. 
I hear blah-blah-blah as I‘m perching and panicky. And it‘s very difficult to think 
without your pants on. I said nothing.‘ 
A disabled person complains that friends always ask ―What did the doctor say?‖ without 
either the follow-up question ―And what do you think about what s/he said?‖, or by implicitly 
treating the ill person as a ‗testifier‘ (a source of information) and the doctor as the 
‗interpreter and actor‘ (who acts on the information) (personal communication). Leontiou 
concurs when she writes: 
‗What I find most striking is that, when I reflect on the good interventions that I have 
brought to my son, most have been recommendations from other mothers. Doctors 
don‘t offer many ideas for navigating the world of disability. Yet, I am repeatedly 
asked, ―What do the doctors say?‖ I don‘t know exactly how to answer this question. 
Rather, I‘m interested in examining how asking this question places the doctor in a 
                                                                
9
 Self-censoring is another form of epistemic injustice, in which the negative stereotyping is 
internalised by the patient herself, leading her to downgrade her own testimony.  
14 
 
central position and gives the impression that the doctor is the only one who knows. I 
have never been asked, ―What do other parents who are in your circumstance say?‖‘ 
(2010, 2) 
More extreme historical examples are the following. The first is the case of curare, a poison 
that causes paralysis that was used as a general anaesthetic for major surgery in the 1940s 
under the misapprehension that curare was a general anaesthetic. As Daniel Dennett writes:  
‗The patients were, of course, quiet under the knife […] but when the effects of the 
curare wore off, complained bitterly of having been completely conscious and in 
excruciating pain. The doctors did not believe them. (The fact that most of the 
patients were infants and small children may explain this credibility gap). Eventually 
a doctor bravely committed to an elaborate test under curare and his detailed 
confirmation of his subjects‘ reports was believed by his colleagues‘ (1981, 209).  
Another example also involves the use of anaesthetic. David Wootton describes how nitrous 
oxide was discovered and its analgesic properties noted in 1795, but only put into use as 
anaesthetic in 1846. He writes:  
‗you need to imagine what it was like to become so accustomed to the screams of 
patients that they seemed perfectly natural and normal; so accustomed to them that 
you could read with interest about nitrous oxide, could go to a fairground and try it 
out, and never imagine that it might have practical applications‘ (2007, 22-3).  
Let us offer one final example, that of psychiatric patients who also have a physical disorder. 
Here is Elyn Saks‘ account of her brain haemorrhage: 
Do ill people suffer epistemic injustice? 
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‗Quickly, they bundled me into the car and took me to the emergency room. Where a 
completely predictable disaster happened: the ER discovered I had a psychiatric 
history. And that was the end of any further diagnostic work. […] Poor Maria was 
literally jumping up and down trying to tell anyone who‘d listen that she had seen me 
psychotic before and that this was different. But her testimony didn‘t help – I was a 
mental patient. The ER sent me home‘ (2007, 232-3). 
Saks also recounts the story of a psychiatric patient who went for weeks with a broken back, 
because none of the medical staff the patient saw took his pain seriously (ibid., 232). These 
last examples may seem extreme; we present them in order to demonstrate that epistemic 
injustice in the case of illness can have devastating effects and can range from the subtle and 
hard to detect bias to brutal rejection of clear evidence of suffering. 
Such iterated experiences give rise to the self-propagating nature of such acts of exclusion: 
the patient‘s testimonials are ignored or downplayed, which upsets the person offering 
testimony and interpretation. This on its own is wrong and gives rise to the common 
complaint that ‗the doctor doesn‘t listen to me‘. But it also affects future epistemic offers, so 
testimonials may become infused with self-doubt and emotionally-charged, therefore 
confirming the doctors‘ perception of that patient as a poor testifier, leading to a vicious 
circle of damaging communication. 
 
3. Epistemic privilege 
Another side to this discussion of epistemic injustice is the epistemic privilege accorded to 
health professionals. This privilege is accorded by virtue of their training, expertise or third-
16 
 
person psychology, such that they occupy the epistemically privileged role of receiving, 
assessing and deciding which testimonies and interpretations to act upon, as well as deciding 
what sorts of testimonies to receive, from whom, what form they can take, and so on. In this 
section we will discuss this, more elusive, kind of epistemic injustice and relate it to the 
difference between patients‘ and physicians‘ attitudes to illness. Moreover, we claim that the 
structures and discourses of contemporary healthcare practice might encourage epistemic 
injustice because they privilege certain styles of articulating testimonies, forms of evidence, 
ways of presenting and sharing knowledge, and so on. We claim that modern healthcare 
practices privilege impersonal third-person reports and empirical data over personal anecdote 
and pathographic testimonies in a way that structurally disables certain testimonial and 
hermeneutical activities. Different kinds of epistemic injustice can occur separately or could 
be mutually reinforcing; where all three are present and active one has what Fricker calls 
―persistent systematic epistemic injustice‖ (2007, 58). It is worth noting that many health 
professionals might like to spend more time and energy taking seriously patient testimonies, 
but the pressures – of time, financial resource, task-based organisational processes, etc. – that 
they operate under forbid it. Many health professionals may be unwillingly epistemically 
unjust and would have liked this aspect of their work to be different. Structural and 
hierarchical features of the healthcare system are the cause of the epistemic injustice, rather 
than any individual‘s intent. 
Both health professionals and ill persons are epistemically privileged for different reasons. 
But only the health professionals‘ privileged epistemic status ‗really matters‘ when it comes 
to healthcare practice and policy. The knowledge of patients is usually confined to the private 
realm and is not readily incorporated into decision making, intervention design, and policy 
documents. In recent years the terms ‗patient centred-care‘, ‗the patient expert‘, and ‗patient 
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experience‘ have become more common in policy documents and mission statements, and we 
hope that with time these translate into actual and concrete difference to healthcare 
provision.
10
 But healthcare failures are still abundant and reflect the institutionalising and 
morally paralysing force of current healthcare provision arrangements.
11
 There are several 
reasons for the epistemic privileging of health professionals, and in particular of physicians. 
First, on the medical view the goal of medicine is to repair physiological mechanisms. The 
third-person view dominates this model and has no obvious room for first-person testimonies. 
Second, in a performance-based target-driven culture patient input has little place. Third, in a 
large-scale healthcare system in which performance is judged quantitatively, qualitative 
statements are difficult to utilise. Fourth, patient views are often seen as anecdotal and 
context-dependent and therefore lacking any long-term utility. Finally, patient views can be 
as numerous as patients and therefore it is unclear whose views should be acted on.
12
 
The knowledge each group might bear is different. Patients have the knowledge of how a 
particular condition feels, how it impacts on their life, and changes day-to-day activities 
(Carel 2010). Only they can say whether a certain treatment causes pain, or how well they 
feel. Health professionals have the scientific and medical knowledge of anatomy, physiology, 
and so on and knowledge of available treatments. Of course the two domains of knowledge 
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 See for example the work of organisations such as the King’s Fund and the Point of Care 
Foundation and, for the UK National Health Service, Coulter and Ellins (2006), Greener 
(2009), and McIver (2011). 
11
 A vivid and tragic example is the series of systematic failures which led to the death of 
hundreds of patients, uncovered by the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry, led by Sir Robert Francis in the UK. See:  
http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/report (accessed on 10 June 2013). 
12
 A recent analogous example is a ‘student satisfaction’ survey at a UK university, in which 
some students stated they wanted to be able to use their mobile phones in the library. As a 
result the use of mobile phones was permitted in the library, no doubt to the detriment of the 
many students who wanted the library to be a quiet place of study. Patient views may be 
similarly in tension with one another. 
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do not belong exclusively to one epistemic group. For example, a physician with an extensive 
experience of treating a particular disease may have excellent knowledge of the limitations on 
daily living it may impose on patients although she has no first person experience of the 
disease. Similarly, the ‗patient expert‘ may develop a deep understanding of their condition 
and its causes, as well as be an authority on available and experimental treatments, trials, and 
research in the field. Moreover, the two groups may work collaboratively to integrate and 
promote both kinds of knowledge (Rosenbaum 2012). These two domains of knowledge are 
different also in how such knowledge is gained (Carel 2013).  
What is taking place in the epistemic domain with respect to these two groups and these two 
kinds of knowledge needs to be related to broader issues concerning the relationships of 
priority and power – as well as reciprocity – between different epistemically privileged 
groups. Thus for example patients are expected to be told what to do by doctors, but doctors 
are not expected, bar some rare cases, to be told what to do by patients. There is an 
asymmetry in the relationship owing to an implicit hierarchy assigning the health 
professional (normally a physician) a high epistemic status that is linked to a professional and 
widely acknowledged social position. 
The term ‗epistemic privilege‘ has three related components; parsing them will allow us to 
offer a more fine-grained account of the epistemic relationship between ill persons and health 
practitioners. A person or social type (‗doctor‘, ‗consultant‘) may be epistemically privileged 
because they have the authority to establish, and where necessary to enforce, the standards 
and norms for epistemic exchange in a given community. For instance, the medical 
community is epistemically privileged because it can define and characterise medical 
concepts (like ‗health‘ and ‗disease‘) and so sets the terms for authoritative debates about 
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health and healing.
13
 Although this does not prevent ill persons from having parallel debates, 
it ensures that their debates are not considered authoritative. 
A person or social type may be epistemically privileged because they occupy an authoritative 
procedural role in epistemic exchanges, for instance by acting as gatekeepers controlling 
which persons and groups are included, and what degree of credibility and authority they are 
assigned, and acting to enforce discipline within the epistemic community. For instance, a 
hospital review committee is epistemically privileged because it has the authority to decide 
how to populate the committee, who are permanent and who are invited members, which 
persons have secondary status (like ‗observer‘ or ‗invited participant‘), who acts as chair, 
what the agenda for debate is, and so on. A person or social type may be epistemically 
privileged, finally, if they have what one might call power of decision, that is, if it is their 
privilege to decide when an issue is settled, when enough evidence has been presented, when 
a particular issue has been given sufficient time and attention, and so on. 
These three forms of epistemic privilege are likely to arise together and be mutually 
reinforcing. Consider a hypothetical case in which a group of patients with chronic rheumatic 
disease are invited to sit on a committee reviewing the physiotherapy provision available to 
them. Those patients might suffer epistemic injustice in this case because they lack epistemic 
privilege in the three ways articulated above. First, they are denied any opportunity to 
determine whether or not the definition of the concept of ‗health‘ being used is appropriate or 
consonant with their experiences or reflective of their testimonies; for instance if health is 
defined in terms of their performance of physiotherapy exercises rather than their capacity to 
                                                                
13 The fact that the medical community has these forms of social and epistemic power does 
not, of course, entail that they always exercise that power in a robustly procedural manner 
(see Kidd forthcoming a). 
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perform everyday tasks like driving. Second, their epistemic authority is minimised because 
their status is that of ‗invited observers‘ who can be consulted (e.g. about the utility of current 
physiotherapy arrangements) but who have no substantive critical powers (e.g. they can raise 
objections, but only ‗for the record‘). Third, those rheumatic patients lack any decisive role in 
the review committee because they have no power of vote and so cannot enforce their 
insistence that certain issues be readdressed or discussed more thoroughly.  
We do not wish for this debate to sound one-sided or blind to the great epistemic merit of 
medical training and practice. We do wish to draw attention to the type of procedures and 
structures, as well as culture and discourse, common in Western healthcare and the resulting 
epistemic injustice. We do not aim to attack any specific epistemic group, but point to the 
current arrangements that give rise to epistemic injustice at a considerable cost to patients and 
possibly to health professionals who are constrained by these very practices. To this end we 
claim that it is useful to distinguish between warranted and unwarranted epistemic privilege, 
e.g. healthcare professionals warrant epistemic privilege in their interpretation of a CT scan, 
but not in deciding how a patient should die (e.g. in hospital or at home).We fully 
acknowledge that certain persons and professions are epistemically privileged (at least in 
certain cases). But there may be cases where the epistemic privilege of health professionals is 
unwarranted; for instance if the assignment of epistemic privilege is grounded in the 
presumptive judgement that there are no other plausible candidates for privileged epistemic 
status in the context of certain forms of patient care. Many religious persons who experience 
depression naturally turn to those persons they recognise as having clerical authority and who 
are, in their judgement, charged with their spiritual and personal care (cf. Scrutton 
forthcoming and Kidd forthcoming b). Some argue that doctors are exempt from certain 
charges of epistemic error – e.g. their being hoodwinked by the biases in the academic 
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literature concerning the efficacy of drugs – because they are simply too busy to perform the 
long and complex processes of survey and analysis (cf. Goldacre 2012). 
 
4. Addressing epistemic injustice: a phenomenological patient toolkit 
So far we have examined epistemic injustice in illness. We argued that illness might give rise 
to testimonial injustice, when patients‘ claims are ignored or rejected, and to hermeneutical 
injustice, when patients do not have the concepts with which to articulate their illness 
experiences. In this section we claim that not only is this epistemic injustice unwarranted, but 
that certain experiences of illness can afford epistemic privileges to the ill person that are not 
otherwise available to (and perhaps not fully shareable with) persons not ill. This idea has 
important ethical implications: it calls us to take seriously the standpoint of ill persons, 
militates against paternalism, and acknowledges the essential role that ill persons should play 
in the formulation and implementation of healthcare policy. We suggest that a particular 
approach to illness, phenomenology, can give us the essential tools for overcoming epistemic 
injustice and can therefore contribute to explicating the experience of illness. We further 
suggest that phenomenology is intimately connected to issues of epistemic justice, since two 
core phenomenological ambitions are to (i) identify and articulate the tacit structures that 
underpin one‘s experience and engagement with the world and (ii) to provide a means of 
taking seriously the (often radically different) experiences of others (cf. Ratcliffe 2012). 
The idea behind the toolkit is that philosophical concepts can be a useful aid for patients who 
are trying to make sense of their illness. Patients may have ethical, existential or 
metaphysical concerns that have a distinctive philosophical flavour, but are not 
conceptualised as such. For example, those nearing the end of life may reflect on its shortness 
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of life, and wonder whether they have lived a good life. Developing and articulating such 
reflection is a distinctively philosophical activity, albeit of a unique sort. These reflections are 
foisted upon the ill individual by their unwanted illness; the context in which this 
philosophical activity takes places is difficult and physically and emotionally taxing; and 
such reflection stems from concrete and idiosyncratic concerns rather than from engagement 
with abstract questions. In order to enable this philosophical activity a toolkit has been 
developed, which helps patients understand the impact illness may have on their life as a 
whole (Carel 2012). It provides philosophical concepts through which the impact may be 
understood. These concepts are taken from phenomenology and are utilised in order to 
provide an account of the holistic and all-encompassing nature of illness (Carel 2008). The 
practice of philosophy may help in this particular case to ameliorate epistemic injustice by 
giving patients the ability to conceptualise and articulate their knowledge and interpretation 
of their illness experiences, thus addressing the hermeneutical gap Fricker laments.  
This toolkit is not intended to replace medical knowledge or treatment but to supplement it. It 
answers a need identified by many patients as well as health professionals to better 
understand the illness experience of individuals and groups with particular conditions. For 
example, a GP pointed out the need for narrative humility among physicians, and the 
personal growth that listening to patients in a holistic way would bring (personal 
communication).
14
 There is a knowledge that arises from having a particular illness 
experience that should not be dismissed as irrelevant or too emotive, as it crucially interlaces 
with and illuminates the medical facts. We propose that adding first-person accounts of the 
illness experience to the overall medical picture may make diagnostic, therapeutic and 
                                                                
14
 These ideas were brought up in a toolkit workshop conducted on 14 and 21 September 
2012 in Bristol. 
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empathetic contributions to healthcare provision. Incorporating patients‘ insights can help 
with the diagnosis and treatment of illness and also enrich health professionals‘ empathy as 
well as guard against alienation. 
This involves the transition from the ‗informational perspective‘, which sees the speaker as a 
―potential recipient or source of information‖ to the ‗participant perspective‘, in which we see 
the quest for knowledge as a shared enterprise and the patient speaker as ―competent to carry 
out some particular activity that has a fundamental role in carrying out inquiries‖ (Hookway 
2010, 156-7). As Hookway suggests, ―there could be a form of injustice related to assertion 
and testimony that consisted, not in a silencing refusal to take the testimony to be true or 
expressing knowledge, but in a refusal to take seriously the ability of the agent to provide 
information that is relevant in the current context‖ (2010, 158). It seems to us that it is 
frequently the ill person‘s ability to offer relevant assertions is being questioned, rather than 
their ability to make assertions at all.
15
 The patient in such cases is ―recognised as unable to 
participate in activities whose content is intrinsically epistemic‖ (Hookway 2010, 159). A 
forum in which patients can gain epistemic confidence and order and discern their 
experiences of illness might help tackle epistemic injustice by supporting patients‘ transition 
from informational to participant perspective. 
Here is a brief outline of the toolkit (for a fuller account see Carel 2012).The toolkit provides 
a flexible individual tool which patients can use to develop their understanding of their 
illness. It includes three steps: the phenomenological reduction, thematizing illness, and 
reviewing the ill person‘s being in the world. Serious illness removes our conventional 
understandings and expectations and is thus an opportunity to examine and re-evaluate 
                                                                
15
 The case of some mental disorders, e.g. psychosis, would be different. In these cases the 
patient may be considered altogether irrational and unable to make true assertions at all. 
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choices, routines, and habits. Merleau-Ponty (1964) says that reflection ―slackens the 
intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice‖ (xiii). 
Illness enables such withdrawal, which is often imposed on the ill person. Phenomenology is 
committed to making explicit aspects of experience that are overlooked by other approaches 
and may be poorly understood. A phenomenological approach to the experience of illness 
requires a suspension of a ―natural attitude‖ of implicitly accepting the background sense of 
belonging to a world and various interpretive dogmas along with it. Bracketing the natural 
attitude is a withdrawal from the ordinarily implicit commitment to the reality of the world 
(Ratcliffe 2008, 4). As Husserl says, this is not a sceptical or idealist position. Rather, this 
‗inhibiting‘ or ‗putting out of play‘ of the natural attitude exposes ―the universe of 
phenomena in the phenomenological sense‖ (Husserl 1999, 20). This suspension allows 
under-theorized aspects of experience to become an object of inquiry because it enables us to 
shift attention from the given object to the way in which it is given and its modes of 
appearance to us. 
Bracketing the natural attitude toward illness suspends the belief in the reality of an objective 
disease entity. Shifting the focus away from the disease entity and toward the experience of it 
can disclose new features of this experience. We usually take the disease entity for granted 
and posit it as the source of the illness experience. But in fact, for the ill person the illness 
experience comes before the objective disease entity (Toombs 1987). Once the belief in the 
objective disease entity is bracketed and we are distanced from our usual way of 
experiencing, we can begin to explore how illness appears to the ill person, its structure, and 
its essential features.  
The second step in the toolkit is thematizing illness. ‗Thematizing‘ refers to the act of 
attending to a phenomenon, which makes particular aspects of it explicit (Toombs 1987, 
Do ill people suffer epistemic injustice? 
25 
 
222). A theme for a particular consciousness is that upon which it focuses its attention. But 
this does not simply denote the intentional object. It also takes into account the kind of 
attentional focus given to an entity. Thematizing may include attending to the cognitive, emo-
tive, moral, or aesthetic aspects of a phenomenon. A patient may thematize her illness as a 
central feature of her life, attending to her symptoms as pervasive, while the physician may 
thematize the illness as a ‗case of cancer‘, attending to symptoms as diagnostic clues (ibid.). 
The understanding that illness is not an objective entity and the exercise of thematizing may 
help patients because it enables moving away from prescriptive pronouncements toward a 
descriptive mode. Thematizing can be used for bringing out the multiple perspectives on 
one‘s illness that patient, family, health professionals, and others may have, as each will 
thematize an illness differently. The patient may thematize her illness emotively, while a 
health professional will thematize it cognitively. A family member may thematize illness as 
an experience of empathy. Exploring the different thematic centres illness may have can 
illuminate its multiple ways of appearing. 
The third step of the toolkit is to take the new understanding of illness (as a form of 
distancing that has been thematized) and examine how it changes one‘s being in the world. 
The term ‗being in the world‘ is used by Heidegger (1962) to denote the human being in the 
broadest sense. Being in the world includes the biological entity, the person, and her 
environment and meaningful connections. This term provides a rich account of what it means 
to exist as a human being. The toolkit uses being in the world to capture the pervasive effects 
illness may have on one‘s sense of place, on one‘s interactions with the environment and with 
other people, on meanings and norms, and on the nexus of entities, habits, knowledge, and 
other people that makes up one‘s world. By moving away from a narrow understanding of 
26 
 
illness as a biological process, a thick account of illness as a new way of being in the world 
can be developed by patients.  
The toolkit has been shared with patient groups as well as with a group of GPs in a 
consultative process. Initial reactions to it demonstrate the feasibility and helpfulness of such 
a tool.
16
 For example, the GP group consulted suggested the toolkit would be of particular use 
with elderly patients and those suffering from depression. Patients suggested that the toolkit 
would help them by empowering them to ―speak their mind‖ and offering an opportunity for 
reflection rather than self-pity. Such a toolkit would allow a space for grieving and would 
enable patients to take responsibility for their understanding of illness via enhancing their 
self-knowledge. We are not suggesting that the toolkit is a sole way of addressing epistemic 
injustice, but suggest it as one possible remedy, that in conjunction with other measures may 
begin to address the problems outlined in this paper. 
 
Conclusion 
We would like to conclude by suggesting that on closer inspection it seems that the epistemic 
injustice identified by Fricker is much more widespread than we would like to think. Fricker 
herself comments: ―I believe that there are areas where injustice is normal and that the only 
way to reveal what is involved in epistemic injustice (indeed, even to see that there is such a 
thing as epistemic injustice) is by looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice‖ 
(2007, viii). It would be interesting to view exchanges between social workers and ‗clients‘, 
                                                                
16
 These comments were collected during three consultative sessions. One, with a group of 
GPs, took place on 14 June 2012 in Bristol. Two patient group sessions took place on 14 and 
21 September 2012 in Bristol. 
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prison inmates and wardens, police officers and suspects, to expose some similarities in the 
styles of epistemic exclusion that characterise particularly asymmetrical power relations. We 
hope we have begun this task by discussing the case of epistemic injustice in ill health and in 
the exchanges between patients and health professionals.  
Fricker writes:  
‗prejudice tends to go most unchecked when it operates by way of stereotypical 
images held in the collective social imagination, since images can operate beneath the 
radar of our ordinary doxastic self-scrutiny, sometimes even despite beliefs to the 
contrary [...] our everyday moral discourse lacks a well-established understanding of 
the wrong that is done to someone when they are treated in this way‘ (2007, 40). 
It is our hope that this paper will contribute to the effort of lifting stereotypes and biases 
about ill people and about illness from the unconscious collective imagination to the 
conscious level and therefore make it available to the careful scrutiny it deserves. 
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